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282 Md. 413, 384 A.2d 742 (1978). In 
Feissner, liability of the employer and its 
insurer was simultaneously discharged un-
der a statutory offset provision when the 
claimant received superior benefits from a 
government pension plan. This discharge 
occurred before the attorney had filed a fee 
petition. However, in the case herein as 
well as in Hoffman, the appellee's liability 
was not discharged. The attorney's lien 
"subsequently did attach to a portion 
thereof, obligating the appellees to pay 
claimant's attorney." Id. at 53, 517 A.2d 
at 354. 
The court in Staley has clarified any am-
biguity that may have existed concerning 
the procedures to follow for attorney fees 
stemming from workers' compensation 
cases. It is clear that the court here has 
rightfully placed the interests of the com-
pensation claimant ahead of governmental 
bureaucracy. 
- Christopher Hale 
Dade County School Board v. Polite: 
FLORIDA ACCEPTS THE 
PREMISES EXCEPTION TO THE 
GOING AND COMING RULE FOR 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS. 
In Dade County School Board v. Polite, 
495 So.2d 795 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1986), the 
District Court of Appeal of Florida af-
firmed the Deputy Commissioner's deter-
mination that a teacher's injuries were 
compensable in that they arose out of and 
in the course of employment. The District 
Court of Appeal of Florida also held that 
the teacher was not precluded from receiv-
ing benefits by the rule that an employee 
going and coming from work is normally 
considered outside the scope of his employ-
ment, thereby recognizing the premises 
exception. 
In Dade County, a physical education 
teacher, Ms. Cheryl Polite, was injured 
when her automobile was struck by a hit-
and-run driver after she had left a track 
meet. At the time of the accident she was 
returning the track equipment to the school 
from which she had borrowed it. Polite 
was employed by the Dade County School 
Board as a physical education teacher. 
Polite taught at North Glade Elementary 
School in the morning and at Lake Stevens 
Elementary School in the afternoon, five 
days a week. Although her workday offi-
cially ended at 3:05 p.m. daily, Polite par-
ticipated in after-school activities which 
were officially encouraged and reflected in 
a positive fashion on teacher evaluations. 
Throughout Polite's employment she had 
consistently participated in extracurricu-
lar activities with which the Dade County 
School Board had knowledge of and given 
its approval. 
On the day of the accident, a track meet 
involving students from Polite's morning 
school, North Glade, was held at Skylake 
Elementary School in the afternoon. Polite 
was to teach physical education at Lake 
Stevens Elementary School that afternoon, 
but, on this day the Lake Stevens' students 
were released from school at 1 :45 p.m. 
Nevetheless, Polite was required to remain 
until 3:05 p.m. Polite then requested and 
was granted permission to leave Lake 
Stevens earlier than 3:05 p.m. Before leav-
ing Polite collected some of Lake Stevens' 
track equipment which she knew might be 
needed at the track meet. Because she felt 
that the equipment might be needed the fol-
lowing day by Lake Stevens' instructors, 
Polite intended to return the equipment 
immediately following the track meet. 
Ms. Polite went to the track meet and as-
sisted at the starting line. She left Skylake 
before 4:00 p.m. traveling the only road 
leading away from the school en route to 
Lake Stevens to return the track equip-
ment. While on the road, Polite's auto-
mobile was struck in the rear by a hit-and-
run driver, causing injury to her back, foot, 
right knee and right hand. 
Appellants Dade County School District 
and their insurer, Gallagher Bassett Insur-
ance Service, argued that Polite's claims 
for medical expenses should be denied be-
cause of the "going and coming rule." In 
the alternative, the appellants argued that 
Polite's injuries were not compensable be-
cause attendance at the meet was not in the 
course of her employment because there 
was no requirement that she attend. The 
Deputy Commissioner in determining that 
the injuries were compensable held that 
the "after hours teacher participation was 
expected and considered in performance 
evaluations." 495 So.2d at 797. The Dep-
uty Commissioner further held that Ms. 
Polite was not precluded from benefits by 
the going and coming rule because she 
was not traveling to her home, but was 
en route back to Lake Stevens to return the 
track equipment. Therefore, the commis-
sioner determined that the injuries arose 
out of and in the course of Polite's employ-
ment, thereby allowing the medical bene-
fits sought and not precluding them by the 
going and coming rule. Id. at 797. 
The District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
in affirming the Deputy Commissioner's 
determinations, stated that the encourage-
ment and reward by way of positive perfor-
mance teacher evaluations was "compe-
tent" and "substantial evidence" to show 
Polite was in the course of her employ-
ment. Id. at 797. Further support for the 
court's holding was found in the fact that 
Polite "did not merely elect to attend" the 
after school activity since the activity was 
related to her field of expertise. The court 
also found other evidence from which it 
could have been reasonably inferred that 
"Polite arrived and assisted at the meet at 
least partially during her regular working 
hours, since she sought and obtained offi-
cial permission to leave her afternoon as-
signment early in order to attend." Id. 
In affirming the commissioner's decision 
that medical benefits are not precluded by 
the "going and coming rule," the court first 
stated the general proposition expounded 
in Stacy v. Cherry Farms, Inc., 449 So.2d 
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393 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) that an employee 
going and coming from work is outside 
the scope of his employment. However, 
the District Court of Appeal of Florida 
looked to Sweat v. Allen, 200 So. 348, 350 
(Fla. 1941) in stating that the "applicabil-
ity of the rule depends upon the circum-
stance of the particular employment." The 
court agreed with the commissioner's de-
cision and found that Polite was not "off-
duty away from the employer's premises." 
Id. Further, the court stated that "compen-
sability is almost always awarded when the 
injury occurs while the employee is travel-
ing along a public road between two por-
tionsof the employer's premises", citing 
Larson on Worker's Compensation Law 
§ 15-14(a) (1985). The court's essential 
reasoning for finding an exception to the 
going and coming rule was grounded in 
the fact that Ms. Polite's duties required 
her to be in two different locations within 
the Dade County school system, and the 
travel between the two different work-
places "was an essential part of her em-
ployment.'~ Id. 
The District Court of Appeal of Florida 
examined this case in two steps. First, an 
examination of the compensability of the 
injury found that the encouragement of 
participating in after school activities, 
coupled with the official permission and 
knowledge of such participation by the 
Dade County School System was substan-
tial and competent evidence that the injury 
arose out of and in the course of Polite's 
employment. Second, the findings that 
Polite was not "off-duty" at the time of the 
accident, and that she was traveling the 
only road available allowed the court to ac-
cept the Larson premises exception to the 
"going and coming rule." The importance 
of this Florida court's opinion is its rec-
ognition of the premises exception which 
is present and accepted in a similar form in 
Maryland. 
- Robert L. Kline, III 
Crawley v. General Motors: 
DISPENSING WITH DISABILITY 
IN OCCUPATIONAL DEAFNESS 
CLAIMS 
In Crawley v. General Motors, 70 Md. 
App. 100,519 A.2d 1348 (1987) the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland inter-
preted Md. Ann. Code art. 101, § 25A 
(1985) to mean that a claimant's eligibility 
to receive benefits under workers' com-
pensation for occupational deafness is to 
be determined without regard to the em-
ployee's loss of wages or his ability to per-
form his regular type of work. Prior to this 
interpretation of § 25A, an employee who 
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suffered from a hearing impairment as a 
result of industrial noise had to demon-
strate a loss of wages or an incapacity to 
perform his regular work before being eli-
gible for workers' compensation. By dis-
pensing with this disability requirement, 
the court of special appeals has increased 
the number of claimants who are entitled 
to benefits for occupational deafness. Now, 
a claimant has to suffer only a compensable 
amount of hearing loss before being eligible 
for workers' compensation. 
For over twenty years, Douglas Crawley, 
Sr. had been exposed to industrial noise in 
the assembly division of General Motors 
where he worked. Alleging that he sus-
tained a hearing loss as a result of his con-
tinued exposure to the industrial noise at 
General Motors, Crawley filed a claim 
with the Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion. The Commission determined that 
Crawley had sustained a compensable de-
gree of hearing loss resulting from his em-
ployment and awarded him benefits. 
General Motors appealed to the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, arguing that a 
"disablement" was necessary before an em-
ployee could be compensated for occupa-
tional deafness. Crawley stipulated that he 
had not suffered any "disablement." Rely-
ing on Belschner v. Anchor Post Prods., 
Inc., 227 Md. 89,175 A.2d419 (1961), the 
circuit court judge reversed the commis-
sion's order of award. 
The claimant in Belschner had been em-
ployed as a saw operator for twelve years 
and as a result of this employment, suf-
fered a compensable amount of hearing 
loss. The claimant, however, was still per-
forming his duties as a saw operator and 
did not lose any wages. The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland affirmed the Workers' 
Compensation Commission's rejection of 
the claim and held that worker's compen-
sation for an employee's loss of hearing 
was limited by the language of § 22(a): 
Where an employee of an employer 
subject to this article suffers from an 
occupational disease, and is thereby dis-
abled from performing his work in the 
last occupation in which he was injur-
iously exposed to the hazards of such 
disease, and the disease was due to the 
nature of the occupation ... the em-
ployee ... shall be entitled to compen-
sation ... . 
Md. Ann. Code art. 101, § 22(a) (1985) 
(emphasis added). 
The court of appeals in Belschner also 
analyzed the definitions of "occupational 
disease" and "disablement" in reaching its 
conclusion. Section 67(13) defines "occu-
pational disease" as "the event of an em-
ployee's becoming actually incapacitated, 
either temporarily, partially or totally, be-
cause of a disease contracted as the result 
of and in the course of employment." Sec-
tion 67(15) defines "disablement" as "the 
event of an employee's becoming actually 
incapacitated, either partly or totally." 
Citing Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. 
Coody, 278 S.W. 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1926), the court therein held that an em-
ployee is not actually incapacitated within 
the intent of the law if the employee has 
the capacity to continue his regular em-
ployment and receives his usual rate of 
pay. Although Belschner held that disable-
ment was a prerequisite for worker's com-
pensation for occupational deafness, the 
court therein stated, "If there is a need to 
liberalize the law or to change what we 
think it plainly means, that is a legislative, 
not a judicial function." Belschner, 227 
Md. at 95, 175 A.2d at 422. 
In 1967, six years after the Belschner de-
cision, the Maryland General Assembly 
enacted art. 101, § 25A entitled "Occu-
pational deafness." The court of special 
appeals in Crawley was confronted with 
interpreting this section to resolve the dis-
pute. Crawley contended that the legisla-
ture in enacting § 25A was responding to 
the Belschner court's invitation to change 
the law. General Motors, on the other 
hand, contended that the legislature in-
tended the disability requirement of§ 22(a) 
to apply, viewing § 25A as merely estab-
lishing highly technical criteria for mea-
suring occupational deafness. 
The court of special appeals began its 
inquiry of the legislative intent by examin-
ing § 25A itself. "Although the language of 
section 25A does not specifically state 
whether the General Assembly intended to 
eliminate disablement as a precondition of 
recovery for occupational deafness. Never-
theless, section 25A(a) reads 'Occupational 
deafness shall be compensated according 
to the terms and conditions of this sec-
tion.'" Crawley, 70 Md. App. at 106, 519 
A.2d at 1351 (emphasis in original). Con-
cluding that the language of the section is 
ambiguous and not clearly revealing the 
legislative intent, the court examined the 
legislative history of the section. 
After examining the legislative history 
of § 25A, the court concluded that the leg-
islature not only intended to provide tech-
nical criteria for measuring loss of hearing 
but also intended to make occupational 
deafness compensable regardless of an em-
ployee's inability to work or loss of wages. 
In reaching such a conclusion, the court 
found the language of§ 25A(c) significant. 
"By providing that a hearing loss of 15 
decibels or less shall not constitute a com-
pensable disability, the language employed 
by the Legislature implies that a hearing 
